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The Proper Basis for Exercising Jurisdiction in Internet 
Disputes: Strengthening State Boundaries or Moving 
Towards Unification? 
Niloufer Selvadurai * 
It is widely accepted that the nature of internet technology and 
communications has served to undermine the effectiveness of the rules of 
international law which govern the determination of jurisdiction in internet 
disputes. Private international law developed on the premise of geographically 
discrete areas that could be effectively governed by nations with clear and 
delineated boundaries. However, the nature of internet communications dissects 
and transcends national boundaries. Material published on the internet can be 
uploaded in one state, downloaded in another, and viewed in a large number of 
other states. Damage is typically simultaneously suffered in multiple states, and 
parties to internet disputes are often domiciled or conduct business in differing 
jurisdictions. In such a context, the question becomes on what basis should 
jurisdiction be determined? While there is widespread agreement on the nature of 
the challenge posed by internet jurisdiction, there is significant divergence in the 
proposed solutions.1 The wide spectrum of recommendations for law reform and 
refinement range from those which further strengthen and delineate state 
boundaries to those which embrace unification and international jurisdiction.2 The 
purpose of the present article is to identify and analyze the merits of the various 
                                                          
* Dr. Niloufer Selvadurai, BA LLB (Hons—Class I) Syd PhD Macq, is the Director of Higher 
Degree Research at Macquarie Law School, Macquarie University, Australia. Niloufer has published 
extensively in the field of technology law, and is the Editor-in-Chief of the International Journal of 
Technology Policy and Law and the Telecommunications Editor of the Australian Journal of 
Competition and Consumer Law. 
1 See, e.g., Darrel C. Menthe, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces, 4 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 69 (1998); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Of Nodes and Power Laws: A 
Network Theory Approach to Internet Jurisdiction Through Data Privacy, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 493 
(2004); Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo-location Technologies and Other Means of Placing Borders on 
the ‘Borderless’ Internet, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 101 (2004). 
2 See generally Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 
(2002); Angus Johnston & Edward Powles, The Kings of the World and Their Dukes’ Dilemma: 
Globalisation, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law, in GLOBALISATION & JURISDICTION 13–54 (Piet Jan 
Slot & Mielle Bulterman eds., Kluwer Law International 2004); Patrick R. Wautelet, What Has 
International Private Law Achieved in Meeting the Challenges Posed by Globalisation?, in 
GLOBALISATION AND JURISDICTION, supra, at 55–77 (Piet Jan Slot & Mielle Bulterman eds., Kluwer 
Law International 2004). 
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2 
veins of scholarship and recommendations on this tangled issue. A consideration of 
law and theory, case law and scholarly discourse, will lead to the conclusion that 
the movement to unification provides the most effective solution to achieve 
consistency and certainty in the determination of jurisdiction in internet disputes.  
The determination of jurisdiction over internet activities is a critical legal 
issue because it has become the central forum of the battle to integrate the rule of 
law in the Information Society.3 Hence, it is important to establish clear and 
consistent grounds on which jurisdiction can be asserted in internet disputes. As 
Kightlinger notes, “companies large and small generally prefer predictable legal 
environments to unpredictable environments,” and the same could be said of users.4 
The commercial significance of the issue is highlighted by the growing concern as 
to the practice of forum selection, commonly termed “forum shopping.”5 The 
present lack of “unification”6 or “decisional harmony”7 in jurisdiction rules creates 
an incentive for forum shopping.8 In Smith Kline & French Laboratories, Ltd. v. 
Bloch, Lord Denning eloquently noted that “[a]s a moth is drawn to the light, so is 
a litigant drawn to the United States.”9 In such a context, in which a plaintiff can 
bring its case in multiple jurisdictions, a well-advised plaintiff is likely to 
commence proceedings in the most favorable forum.10 
I. JURISDICTION 
The notion of “jurisdiction” in international law is multifaceted. In United 
States of America v. Vanness, it was observed that the word “[j]urisdiction is a 
                                                          
3 Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951, 1951 
(2005). 
4 Mark F. Kightlinger, A Solution to the Yahoo! Problem? The EC E-Commerce Directive as a 
Model for International Cooperation on Internet Choice of Law, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 719, 765 (2003). 
5 HELENE VAN LITH, INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION: UNIFORM 
RULES FOR CONTRACT DISPUTES 5–6 (T.M.C. Asser Press 2009). 
6 Id. at 5. 
7 Id. at 6. See also Franco Ferrari, ‘Forum Shopping’ Despite International Contract Law 
Conventions, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 689 (2002); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, 
Exorcising the Evil of Forum Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507 (1995); Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum 
Shopping Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553 (1989); Trevor C. Hartley, ‘Libel Tourism’ 
and Conflict of Laws, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 25 (2010). 
8 VAN LITH, supra note 5, at 5–6. 
9 Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, 2 All E.R. 72, 74 (1983), available at http:// 
unisetca.ipower.com/other/cs3/19832AER72.html. 
10 See generally Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677 (1990). 
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3 
word of many, too many, meanings.”11 The strict definition of the word 
“jurisdiction” means the authority of a court to decide a matter.12 The term is also 
more loosely used to describe three elements: the authority of the court to decide a 
matter, the choice of law to apply to the determination of the matter and the 
enforcement of judgments.13 Once it is established that a court has jurisdiction to 
hear a dispute, the court must determine the law that is applicable to the 
proceedings. The “choice” is between the law of the forum or another state, but 
occasionally, the forum court may have to choose between the laws of two foreign 
states.14 
The three-layered structure of jurisdiction mirrors the three-layered structure 
of the internet as identified by Benkler and Werbach and analyzed by Geist.15 
Benkler notes that communication systems can be delineated into three distinct 
layers.16 The first layer comprises the physical layer consisting of the physical 
infrastructure required to connect phones, computers, router and other transmission 
technology.17 The second layer is described as the logical layer and is composed of 
technology required to access the network.18 The third layer is a content layer, 
housing the content of the communication.19 Geist notes that the internet 
jurisdiction can be similarly conceptualised in three layers.20 The first layer is an 
application layer that determines whether courts are entitled to adjudicate a 
particular dispute.21 The second layer is a substantive layer in which courts apply 
                                                          
11 United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
12 BRIAN FITZGERALD ET AL., INTERNET AND E-COMMERCE LAW: BUSINESS AND POLICY 58–59 
(2d ed. 2011). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 90. See further Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International Choice of 
Law and the Internet, 32 INT’L LAW. 991 (1998) (discussing the issue of choice of law); Joel R. 
Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, 1 UNIV. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 213 (2004) (discussing the 
issue of enforcement of decisions through internet instruments). 
15 Michael Geist, Is There a There There? Towards Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 
16 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1345, 1353 (2001) (discussing Professor Yochai Benkler’s presentation content 
at a New York University Conference). 
16 Id. at 1353. 
17 Id.  
18 Id. at 1353–54. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Geist, supra note 15, at 1354.  
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4 
their substantive laws to resolve a dispute.22 Finally, there is the enforcement layer, 
and Geist notes that the online environment often resists the enforcement of foreign 
judgments due to significant distances and relatively insignificant monetary 
awards.23  
The stricter use of the term “jurisdiction” is however confined to the first of 
these three senses and refers to the court’s authority to decide a matter.24 For the 
present analysis, the strict use of the term “jurisdiction” will be utilized. Therefore, 
issues of choice of law and enforcement are outside the ambit of the discussion. A 
State is found to have personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant when it has 
authority to require a defendant to appear before its courts and defend a claim.25 
The notion of “State” refers to a nation, a state or another geographically delineated 
area where a unitary legal system operates.26 Personal jurisdiction is established 
where a defendant voluntarily submits to a court’s jurisdiction or where the 
defendant has been validly served with an originating process pursuant to the rules 
of the court.27 Closely connected to the question of jurisdiction is the principle of 
party autonomy.28 This principle essentially holds that parties should be free to 
decide the forum for the adjudication of disputes.29 The issue of jurisdiction rules 
only becomes relevant in the absence of a choice of forum agreement between 
parties.30 
                                                          
22 Id.  
23 Id. See Alan Reed, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in a Borderless Electronic Environment, in 
THE INTERNET, LAW & SOCIETY (Yamin Akdeniz et al. eds., Longman Pearson 2000). See also Allan R. 
Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32 INT’L LAW. 1167 (1998); Richard 
Garnett, Are Foreign Internet Infringers Beyond the Reach of the Law?, 23 U.N.S.W. LAW. J. 105 
(2000). 
24 FITZGERALD ET AL., supra note 12, at 58. 
25 Id. at 58. See also Bernadette Jew, Cyberjurisdiction—Emerging Issues and Conflicts of Law 
When Overseas Courts Challenge Our Web, in COMPS. & LAW 23 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, Place and 
Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521 (2003). 
26 FITZGERALD ET AL., supra note 12, at 90. 
27 Id. at 59. 
28 Ronald Brand, Balancing Sovereignty and Party Autonomy in Private International Law: 
Regression at the European Court of Justice 8 (Univ. of Pittsburgh School of Law Working Paper No. 
25, 2005), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=pittlwps. 
29 Id. at 8. 
30 Id. at 10.  
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5 
II. ASSERTING JURISDICTION ON THE BASIS OF PURPOSEFUL 
AVAILMENT 
There are a variety of established grounds on which the courts of one State 
can exercise jurisdiction over a citizen, corporation or organization of another State 
in order to adjudicate matters that have affected parties within its boundaries.31 In 
the context of internet disputes, the leading basis for asserting jurisdiction has been 
the purposeful availment principle.32 
Courts in the United States have frequently exercised personal jurisdiction 
over non-residents on the basis that a non-resident defendant has “purposefully 
availed” itself of the privileges and benefits of the State.33 In assessing what 
constitutes purposeful availment in the context of internet disputes, two distinct 
lines of case law have emerged.34 These two streams can be broadly described as 
the Zippo “sliding scale approach”35 and the Calder v. Jones “effects and targeting” 
approach.36 The Zippo scale has now largely fallen out of favor and the prevailing 
test is the Calder v. Jones “effects and targeting” test.37 The effects doctrine 
adopted by courts in the United States can be viewed as being essentially derived 
from the principle of territoriality.38 It is useful to consider both lines of authority.  
The sliding scale approach outlined in Zippo39 requires the court to analyze 
the “nature and quality of commercial activity” of the website involved in the 
proceedings when determining whether jurisdiction is established.40 The court 
noted that “[o]ur review of the cases and materials reveals that the likelihood that 
personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to 
the nature and quality of the commercial activity that an entity conducts over the 
Internet.”41 
                                                          
31 FITZGERALD ET AL., supra note 12, at 71. 
32 Id. at 73. 
33 Id. at 73–74. 
34 Id. 
35 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123–24 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
36 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–90 (1984). 
37 FITZGERALD ET AL., supra note 12, at 78. 
38 See infra Part IV. 
39 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1119. 
40 Id. at 1123–24. 
41 Id. at 1124. 
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6 
Under the Zippo test, websites are seen to encompass a spectrum of differing 
levels of interaction with the jurisdiction in question.42 On one end of the spectrum 
are clearly “passive websites,” which are confined to mere advertising and do not 
actively “reach out and touch” the territory in question.43 The court described these 
websites as a forum “where a defendant has simply posted information on an 
internet website which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions.”44 A passive 
website, a website that “does little more than make information available to those 
who are interested in it,” is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.45 
On the other end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does 
business over the internet and has a fully interactive website that seeks to actively 
engage with the population of the territory in question.46 The court determined that 
in order to assert jurisdiction, such a website must reach out and touch the territory 
in question.47 The court noted that asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant 
is proper when a defendant contracts with the residents of a foreign jurisdiction in 
transmitting computer files over the internet.48  
Interestingly, a center position relates to interactive websites where a user is 
able to exchange information with the host computer.49 In such cases, it is 
necessary for the court to examine “the level of interactivity and the commercial 
nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the website.”50 
The Zippo case involved a trademark dispute between Zippo Manufacturing 
Company, the plaintiff whose principal place of business was in Pennsylvania, and 
Zippo Dot Com, the defendant who operated a commercial internet news service 
                                                          
42 Id. at 1123–24. 
43 Id. at 1124. 
44 Id. 
45 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. While the Zippo test places heavy emphasis on the nature and level of interactivity of the 
website (i.e. passive or interactive), the court also recognised the intention of the defendant. In 
dismissing the defendant’s contention that the connection to Pennsylvania was coincidental and 
fortuitous, the court noted that the defendant “consciously chose to conduct business in Pennsylvania, 
pursuing profits from the actions that are now in question.” Id. at 1127. The court responded that the 
transmission of files was wholly within the defendants control and that therefore the defendant could not 
maintain that the ensuing contracts were coincidental or fortuitous. Id. at 1126.  
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7 
website from California.51 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s use of the 
domain name “Zippo” constituted trademark dilution, infringement and false 
designation pursuant to the United States Federal Trademark Act 1946.52 The 
Pennsylvania federal court justified personal jurisdiction on the basis that the 
website had contracted with approximately 3,000 residents of Pennsylvania and 
seven Pennsylvania internet access providers.53 The court also examined the 
intended object of the transactions in question and noted that it was “the 
downloading of electronic messages that formed the bases of the suit in 
Pennsylvania.”54 In light of the level of interaction with Pennsylvania, the court 
found personal jurisdiction despite the fact that only 2% of the defendant’s 
subscribers were residents of Pennsylvania.55  
In contrast, under the Calder v. Jones56 effects and targeting test, personal 
jurisdiction is found where the defendant is found to have engaged in harmful 
intentional actions which were expressly aimed at the forum state and caused harm, 
and the majority of the harm was suffered and the defendant could foresee that it 
would likely to be suffered, in the jurisdiction in question.57 The test was first 
presented in Calder v. Jones, a defamation case that did not involve the internet. It 
was subsequently applied by a United States District Court in Metro Goldwyn 
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,58 a dispute involving the internet, specifically 
a dispute regarding the use of file-sharing software on the internet. 
The Metro case involved a copyright dispute.59 The defendant provided free 
proprietary software called Kaza Media Desktop to internet users enabling them to 
search and exchange digital media with other users via the file-sharing software.60 
The plaintiff brought an action in California for copyright infringement.61 The 
                                                          
51 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
52 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2006). 
53 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. 1119, at 1125–26. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1127. 
56 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
57 Id. 
58 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1089 (C.D. Cal. 
2003). See also FITZGERALD ET AL., supra note 12, at 157–58. 
59 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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8 
defendant sought to dismiss the action on the basis of a lack of jurisdiction.62 After 
a careful consideration of the facts, the court found that it had jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the matter. In reaching its decision, the court noted that the defendant 
was aware that the Kaza Media Desktop software was used by millions of residents 
in California, and that the defendant was aware that it would be harmed by the 
copyright infringement facilitated by its software.63 
A. The Merits of the Purposeful Availment Approach 
While the Zippo sliding scale test has been applied and refined in a number of 
federal decisions including, most notably, Neogen Corp. v. New Gen Screening,64 it 
has now been largely replaced by the effects and targeting test. The effects and 
targeting test has been noted with approval in a variety of cases, one of them being 
the leading Australian case of Dow Jones & Comp. v. Gutnick.65 In Dow Jones, the 
High Court held that an appellant who published allegedly defamatory material on 
an online news service using servers based in New Jersey was within the personal 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Victoria, Australia, on the basis that the 
alleged defamatory material caused damage to the defendant in the State of 
Victoria.66 Similarly, the High Court of Justice in the United Kingdom applied the 
effects approach in Richardson v. Schwarzenegger67 to hold that a plaintiff, a 
resident of the United Kingdom, could sue for defamation in the United Kingdom 
for statements made on a news website originating in the United States. 
The targeting-based approach has also received support from scholars such as 
Hen who notes that it is proper for a country to assert jurisdiction over a defendant 
who places content on a website which actively targets its citizens.68 Rice and 
Gladstone note that targeting-based analysis is a key ingredient in the application of 
the effects test.69 Redienburg notes that “[t]he internet became popular precisely 
because of the promise of a global audience” and that this promise cannot not be 
                                                          
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2002). 
65 Dow Jones & Co. Inc. v. Gutnick, [2002] 210 CLR 575 (Austl.). 
66 Id.  
67 Richardson v. Schwarzenegger, [2004] EWHC 2422 Q.B. (Eng.). 
68 Julie L. Henn, Targeting Transnational Internet Content Regulation, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 157, 
175–77 (2003). 
69 Id. at 158. 
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9 
used to “absolve online activities of legal responsibility.”70 He notes that while 
online technologies were initially designed for “geographically indifferent access,” 
commercial pressures and the dynamic nature of the internet have now resulted in 
“geolocation and the re-creation of geographic origin and destination.”71 
Redienburg concludes that “[t]his design feature [of the internet] and its 
malleability mean that Internet activity is ‘purposefully availing’ throughout the 
Internet whenever content is posted without geolocation filtering.”72 Thus, as States 
are gravitating to an effects doctrine, they are elevating “submission to the rule of 
law rather than capitulation to an Internet attack.”73 
However, it can be argued that when determining jurisdiction, the 
technological evolution of the internet has undermined the relevance of the concept 
of purposeful availment. The approach of assessing jurisdiction on grounds of 
territoriality, by relying on the characteristics of a particular website is a 
technologically non-neutral principle that is likely to be rendered ineffective by 
technological evolution. Since the formulation of the test 15 years ago, the level of 
interactivity of commercial websites has significantly evolved to the extent that the 
vast majority of commercial websites are now interactive in nature and offer online 
purchase or contact processes. In such a context, the interactivity of the website 
approach, which seeks to classify websites based on passivity or activity, is no 
longer a fine-grain approach to determining the nuances of the nature and extent of 
a website’s connection to the jurisdiction in question. In such a context, the 
conclusion in Dow Jones, that a web publication has an effect and hence, justifies 
jurisdiction wherever the publication is read and comprehended, seems to be the 
single and inevitable result of applying the purposeful availment principle.74 As 
Justice Kirby acknowledged, “[t]he nature of the Web makes it impossible to 
ensure with complete effectiveness the isolation of any geographic area of the 
Earth’s surface from access to a particular website.”75 
Citron further notes that the entire concept of purposeful availment can be 
rendered irrelevant by certain uses of technology such as, Voice over Internet 
Protocol (“VoIP”) technology, because such technology attaches to individuals 
                                                          
70 Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 1956. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 1956. 
73 Id. 
74 Dow Jones & Company, 210 CLR 575, at 26. 
75 Id. at 84. 
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10 
rather than geographical locations.76 In such a context, it is not possible to assert 
that the sender of the communication has availed himself or herself of a particular 
jurisdiction as there is no correlation between the telephone number to which the 
communication is transmitted and the geographical location at which the receiver 
takes delivery of the communication.77 Citron suggests instead a theory of “fair 
play and substantial justice” for asserting jurisdiction in VoIP disputes.78  
Redish further argues that the technological development of the internet 
effectively “renders the concept of purposeful availment both conceptually and 
practically irrelevant,” noting that “[a]n individual or entity may so easily and 
quickly reach the entire world with its message that it is simply not helpful to 
inquire whether, in taking such action, the individual or entity has consciously and 
carefully made the decision either to affiliate with the forum state or to seek its 
benefits.”79 Timofeeva notes that there are a significant number of websites that 
welcome all interested surfers and do not expressly “target” anyone.80 The 
targeting-based approach would seem to exempt such sites from the States’ 
control.81  
Therefore, it would be preferable if the assessment of jurisdiction was not 
based on the technological features of the website but instead, on the substantive 
issues relating to content. For example, the diversity of languages used on internet 
websites is not expressly addressed under the targeting-based test. To what extent 
is the language employed a relevant consideration in determining jurisdiction? This 
movement from the use of technological features to substantive features to govern 
regulation is occurring in other areas of international technology law, notably in the 
convergence law review discourse.82 In 2003, the European Union passed a new 
                                                          
76 Danielle Keats Citron, Minimum Contacts in A Borderless World: Voice over Internet Protocol 
and the Coming Implosion of Personal Jurisdiction Theory, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1481, 1485, 1493–
95 (2006). 
77 Id. at 1486. 
78 Id. at 1520–21. 
79 Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet, and the 
Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 575, 606 (1998). 
80 Yulia A. Timofeeva, Worldwide Prescriptive Jurisdiction in Internet Content Controversies: A 
Comparative Analysis, 20 CONN. J. INT’L L. 199, 214 (2005). 
81 Id. 
82 Australian Convergence Review Committee, Convergence Review—Final Report (Apr. 2012). 
See further Niloufer Selvadurai, Convergence and Media Ownership: The Merits of Repealing the ‘2 out 
of 3 Rule’ and Adopting a National Public Interest Test, 62 TELECOMM. J. AUSTL. 1, 1–3 (2012); 
Niloufer Selvadurai, Regulating for the Future—Accommodating the Effects of Convergence, 13 TRADE 
PRAC. LAW J. 20, 21–22 (2005). 
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11 
regulatory framework for electronic communications that seeks to govern on the 
substantive characteristics of the services provided rather than on the basis of the 
nature of the transmission technology adopted (i.e. broadcasting spectrum or 
telecommunications network).83 This new approach was subsequently adopted by 
other nations, such as South Africa, and is being actively debated in other nations 
such as Australia.84 It is asserted that a similar paradigm shift is necessary in the 
realm of the application of private international law to the selection of jurisdiction 
in disputes involving the internet.  
B. The Development of a Technology-Neutral Purposeful Availment 
Theory 
It does not appear that internet jurisdiction can be solved by creating 
technological boundaries around the internet. However, many private international 
rules currently in place, including the purposeful availment theory, are inherently 
technology-specific formulations. Matwyshyn’s theory of “Trusted Systems” seeks 
to address this problem by extending and developing the purposeful availment 
theory to create a new and technology-neutral paradigm for asserting personal 
jurisdiction in internet proceedings.85 The objective of this theory is to craft a new 
                                                          
83 The regulatory framework consists of four central directives, supported by a series of non-
binding guidelines and recommendations. Directive 2002/21/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of the European Union of Mar. 7, 2002 on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services, 2002 O.J. L 108/33; Directive 2002/20 EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of the European Union on the authorization of electronic communications 
networks and services, 2002 O.J. L 108/21; Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union of July 12, 2002 concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the 
Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. L 201/37; Directive 97/66/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union of Dec. 15, 1997 concerning the 
Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Telecommunications Sector, 2002 O.J. 
L 24/1; Commission Recommendation of the European Communities of Feb. 11, 2003 on Relevant 
Product and Service Markets Within the Electronic Communications Sector Susceptible to ex ante 
Regulation in Accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communication Networks and Services, 2003 O.J. L 
114/45. See Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on the Convergence of the 
Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation, 
Towards an Information Society Approach, COM (97) 623 (1997), for the law reform discourse prior to 
the enactment of the new laws. 
84 AUSTL. COMMC’N & MEDIA AUTH., CONVERGED LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS—
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES (July 2011); DEP’T OF BROADBAND, COMMC’NS & THE DIGITAL ECON., 
CONVERGENCE REVIEW—FRAMING PAPER (Apr. 2011); DEP’T OF BROADBAND, COMMC’NS & THE 
DIGITAL ECON., CONVERGENCE REVIEW—EMERGING ISSUES PAPER (July 2011); DEP’T OF 
BROADBAND, COMMC’NS & THE DIGITAL ECON., CONVERGENCE REVIEW—FINAL REPORT (Apr. 2012). 
See also HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA COLLIDE (N.Y. 
Univ. Press 2d ed. 2006); CONVERGENCE AND FRAGMENTATION: MEDIA TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY (Peter Ludes ed., Intellect Books 2008). 
85 Matwyshyn, supra note 1, at 529. 
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12 
“jurisdictional paradigm” for internet proceedings.86 The article begins by asking 
whether “internet-related harms warrant a fundamentally different personal 
jurisdiction paradigm.”87 The article unequivocally concludes that a fundamentally 
different personal jurisdiction paradigm is warranted because it provides a firmer 
ground for the future evolution of jurisdiction precedents in cases involving harm 
arising from new media.88 
Matwyshyn argues that the present tests applied by the courts are limited in 
their use because they are not technology neutral: “[w]ithout acknowledging it, 
they evolve around one particular incarnation of Network Communications, the 
World Wide Web, in a technologically stagnant manner. As such they are destined 
for a short shelf-life. They do not provide sufficient intellectual flexibility for use 
with the next generation of Network Communications.”89 She advocates the 
abandonment of both the Zippo sliding scale approach and the Calder v. Jones’ 
effects and targeting approach.90 She further supports the adoption of the “Trusted 
Systems” approach that is based on the notion of consensual social responsibility.91 
This entails adopting a new approach that is grounded in consensual social 
responsibility.92 For example, a content service provider purposefully avails itself 
of a forum when it chooses to give access to its content to a critical mass of citizens 
within a particular forum. Resultantly, this creates a social responsibility that 
requires that particular provider to maintain the jurisdiction’s stability of its 
“‘trusted systems’ of economic and information exchange.”93 In such a situation, 
the content service provider has submitted to the personal jurisdiction of the 
forum.94 
However, a significant limitation of Matwyshyn’s theory is that its application 
is confined to the resolution of intentional torts and infringement of intellectual 
property, making it an unlikely solution for the issue of internet jurisdiction. 
                                                          
86 Id. at 494. See also A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in 
Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. REV. 49 (1996). 
87 See Matwyshyn, supra note 1, at 493. 
88 Id. at 540–42. 
89 Id. at 509. 
90 Id. at 496–97. 
91 Id. at 531–32. 
92 Id. at 535. 
93 Matwyshyn, supra note 1, at 530. 
94 Id. at 529–31. See also FITZGERALD ET AL., supra note 12, at 79–80. 
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13 
Therefore, the adoption of a trusted systems model would seem to add another 
layer of complexity to an already complicated set of jurisdiction rules.95 
III. ASSERTING JURISDICTION ON THE BASIS THAT THE INTERNET IS A 
SEPARATE INTERNATIONAL SPACE 
In response to the complex issues raised by private international law, some 
scholars have suggested that the best solution to the problem is to view the internet 
as a separate international space that extends beyond the jurisdiction of any 
individual nation.96  
Johnson and Post are leading cyber-libertarians who have suggested that the 
internet should be viewed as a separate space.97 They suggest that “the line that 
separates online transactions from our dealings in the real word is just as distinct as 
the physical boundaries between our territorial governments—perhaps more so.”98 
They argue that any regulation of such a separate space would be in the form of 
self-regulation.99 These views of Johnson and Post echo the early utopian visions of 
the internet as a free place. As the internet’s economic and commercial significance 
became more clear,, these early views were replaced by a more pragmatic discourse 
as to means of regulating internet transactions. It seems that the complexity of 
achieving effective and consistent regulation has prompted a return to this early 
view.100 
The main obstacle to the adoption of such an approach is that of business 
efficacy and commercial certainty. Such an approach would render the internet a 
high-risk realm for commercial transactions and deter both businesses and 
consumers from engaging in internet commerce.101 Svantesson notes that self-
regulation may lower the public’s trust in the use of the internet, and draws 
                                                          
95 Matwyshyn, supra note 1, at 497–500. 
96 David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. 
L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996). See also Shamoil Shipchandler, The Wild Wild Web: Non-Regulation as the 
Answer to the Regulatory Question, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 435, 436–37 (2000); Dan Jerker B. 
Svantesson, Borders On, or Border Around—The Future of the Internet, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 343, 
345 (2006). 
97 Johnson & Post, supra note 96, at 1367. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 1367–69. 
100 See generally Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998) 
(Goldsmith’s response to the view presented by Johnson and Post). See also David G. Post, Against 
“Against Cyberanarchy,” 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365 (2002) (for Post’s response). 
101 Svantesson, supra note 96, at 361. 
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14 
attention to the practical problems of achieving international agreement to make the 
internet a separate space.102  
Additionally, due to technological evolution, the process of delineating 
activities in the real world and the internet space has become more challenging. 
The convergence of technological, social, and economic realms led to the bundling 
of cable, telephone and internet services, as well as the creation of “smart” home 
appliances and “wired” houses.103 In such a landscape, Svantesson notes that 
getting a beer out of a networked fridge may involve crossing the line into 
cyberspace!104  
A. A Theory of International Spaces 
Like Johnson and Post, Menthe believes that cyberspace should be treated as 
a separate space.105 However, Menthe advocates that this separate realm should be 
governed by the laws of public international law and presents a “Theory of 
International Spaces.”106 Menthe suggests that that there are currently three distinct 
international spaces under public international law—Antarctica, international 
space, and the high seas—and argues that cyberspace should be treated as a fourth 
international space.107  
Territoriality and nationality are two of the established principles which can 
be grounds for asserting jurisdiction within public international law.108 The 
territoriality principle presumes the “absoluteness of boundaries and sovereign 
power within them.”109 
As the territoriality principle is firmly linked to national boundaries, it may at 
first appear to be wholly unsuited to determining jurisdiction in internet content 
disputes. Internet content disputes typically occur transnationally without an 
                                                          
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 363. 
104 Id. (William Gibson first created the term “cyberspace” in the novel Neuromancer (WILLIAM 
GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (1984)).). 
105 Menthe, supra note 1.  
106 Id. at 70. 
107 Id. 
108 Timofeeva, supra note 80, at 201. 
109 Id. On the basis of the territorial principle, a state may assert jurisdiction over persons, 
property, acts and events occurring within its prescribed territory. The subjective territorial principle 
asserts jurisdiction on the basis that the offending activity occurs within the territory. In comparison, the 
objective territorial principle asserts jurisdiction on the basis that the offending activity has its primary 
effect within the relevant territory even though the activity itself has its origins outside the territory. 
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obvious direct connection to a particular territory.110 However, as Timofeeva notes, 
the territoriality principle is useful in controlling internet content issues as it 
enables a State to assert jurisdiction over a variety of parties such as, online 
business and internet service providers, and financial intermediaries, who are 
residents of the State and are involved in providing access to the internet or hosting 
internet content.111 Additionally, Timofeeva notes that territorial jurisdiction may 
apply when a State exercises jurisdiction in a domain name dispute.112 
Jurisdiction can also be asserted on the basis of the nationality principle which 
states that a State may assert jurisdiction on the basis of the nationality of the actor 
or victim.113 Such an assertion of jurisdiction is irrespective of the geographic 
location of where the act was committed.114 The nationality principle appears to be 
eminently suited to the seamless, geographically neutral flow of content over the 
internet.115  
Menthe notes that the theory of international spaces only accepts the 
nationality principle as the basis of jurisdiction in outer space, Antarctica and the 
high seas.116 He notes that in outer space, the relevant category is the nationality of 
the registry of the vessel.117 In Antarctica, the relevant category is the nationality of 
the governing base, and on the high seas, the relevant category is the nationality of 
the vessel.118 Similarly, he notes that in cyberspace, nationality should be the 
determinative factor for asserting jurisdiction.119 Menthe concludes that “[s]uch a 
rule will provide predictability and international uniformity. It strikes a balance 
                                                          
110 Id. at 202.  
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 203. See also Stefan Bechtold, Governance in Namespaces, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1239, 
1259 (2003). 
113 Timofeeva, supra note 80, at 203. 
114 Id. at 203. 
115 The protective principle forms the basis for asserting jurisdiction over parties for acts 
committed outside the state that affect the security of the state. Universal jurisdiction is available in 
limited circumstances where acts are sufficiently heinous to violate the laws of all States. The assertion 
of universal jurisdiction has to date been largely confined to case involving war crimes and acts of 
genocide and terrorism. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBL. INT’L LAW 307 (5th ed. 1998). See 
also Timofeeva, supra note 80, at 215. 
116 Menthe, supra note 1, at 83. 
117 Id.  
118 Id.  
119 Id. 
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between anarchy and universal liability, and it works. Recognition of cyberspace as 
an international space is more than overdue. It is becoming imperative.”120 
Svantesson suggests that Menthe underestimates the relevance of the fact that 
cyberspace is not a physical realm such as outer space, Antarctica and the high 
seas.121 So, even if Menthe’s initial premise that cyberspace should be regulated as 
a separate space, its non-physical nature would justify the application of the 
territorial principle.122 Additionally, the protective principle could be evoked in 
circumstances where the internet threatens the security of the State, such as where a 
state is exposed to a computer virus.123 Svantesson concludes that the 
fundamentally non-physical nature of the internet precludes comparison between 
physical international spaces and cyberspace.124 
Therefore, while it seems that jurisdiction in internet disputes cannot be 
exclusively asserted on the basis of cyberspace being a fourth international space 
justifying the application of the nationality principle of jurisdiction, Menthe’s 
analysis serves to draw attention to the value of public international law in 
providing a solution to the problem of internet jurisdiction. Specifically, Menthe’s 
conclusion as to the inadequacy of present private international law is compelling. 
Menthe argues that unless cyberspace is viewed as a separate international space: 
[C]yberspace takes all the traditional principles of 
conflicts-of-law and reduces them to absurdity. Unlike 
traditional jurisdictional problems that might involve 
two, three, or more conflicting jurisdictions, the set of 
laws which could apply to a simple homespun webpage 
is all of them.125 
Few would dispute the truth in the above statement, and it prompts a 
consideration of the wider role of public international law in achieving unification 
in the approach to internet jurisdiction. This will be the subject of the final section 
of the article. 
                                                          
120 Id. at 102. 
121 Svantesson, supra note 96, at 365.  
122 Id. at 366. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Menthe, supra note 1, at 70–71. 
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IV. THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGICAL TOOLS 
When faced with the challenges of determining jurisdiction in internet 
disputes, scholars are increasingly turning to technological tools and systems to 
precisely delineate the reach of websites so that it is easier to determine jurisdiction 
in internet disputes.126 The argument presented is that the internet is already 
regulated by a combination of law and technology, and that developing further 
technological structures to further regulate internet access is merely an extension of 
the present reality.127 
A. The Imposition of Technological Boundaries 
The role of technology in the context of the jurisdiction question is examined 
by Reidenberg128 and Svantesson in their leading articles on the use of technology 
to regulate the internet.129 In an early article, Reidenberg noted that the network 
design, standards and system configurations can impose rules on internet 
participants.130 In a subsequent article, he noted that technology empowers 
sovereign states with very portent electronic tools to enforce their laws.131 For 
example, technologies such as filters and packet interceptors, and tools such as 
viruses and worms, can enforce laws and provide sanctions for malfeasance.132  
It is suggested that such electronic tools can create “electronic boundaries” 
that prevent wrongdoers from entering a State’s “electronic zone.”133 Reidenberg 
acknowledges that the requirements of a democratic society dictate that a carefully 
prescribed criteria must be adopted to govern such instruments.134 However, if such 
                                                          
126 See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
501 (1999), for a general discussion of the relationship between regulation and technology. Lessig 
considers the values to be kept in mind when working through the conflict between regulations of law, 
and regulations of code: “To the extent that the law uses code, but non-transparently, we have reason to 
question the technique of law. And to the extent that law can achieve its end through code, we have 
reasons to require that the code be narrowly tailored to serve only legitimate state ends.” Id. at 548. See 
also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (Basic Books 1999). 
127 Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through 
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998) [hereinafter Lex Informatica]. 
128 Id. 
129 Svantesson, supra note 96, at 357–58. 
130 Lex Informatica, supra note 127, at 555. 
131 Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 1963–64. 
132 Id. at 1963. 
133 Id. at 1963–64. 
134 Id. at 1964. 
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technological enforcement instruments are framed in a manner analogous to the use 
of traditional civil procedure, Reidenberg argues that it will be feasible to create 
jurisdictional zones that are established through architectural design: “These zones 
will consequently contain geographical indicators because wireless access, the new 
Internet addressing protocol known as Ipv6, and commercial pressure all require 
geographic localization. These zones then form a focus for the establishment by 
states of the rule of law.”135 
In determining whether and how to use technology to enforce the law, it is 
necessary for the State to balance the magnitude and urgency of the threat to public 
order against the effectiveness of the technological tool considered for 
deployment.136 If the tool is not likely to be effective against the violation of the 
rule, Reidenberg argues that collateral implications may be more significant than 
any justificatory use.137 Finally, the State must consider the ultimate enforcement 
objective, whether it is the cessation of the offending activity or the compelling of a 
violator to pay monetary damages.138 Reidenberg concludes that the design of such 
zones can give internet participants the freedom of choice to select whether or not 
their activities give rise to contacts empowering states with personal jurisdiction 
and the application of local laws.139 Finally, Reidenberg endorses technological 
innovation as a means of creating products and services to facilitate such informed 
participation choices by internet users.140 Svantesson notes that they are likely to be 
or already perhaps are already sufficiently accurate for “legal purposes.”141 
                                                          
135 Id. at 1971. 
136 Id. at 1964–65. 
137 Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 1964. 
138 Id. at 1964–65. 
139 Id. at 1973. 
140 Id. at 1971. 
141 Svantesson, supra note 1, at 110. Svantesson outlines the potential operation of geo-locating 
technologies by saying: 
As the access-seeker enters the appropriate Uniform Resource 
Locator (“URL”) into his or her browser, or clicks on the 
appropriate hyperlink, an access-request is sent to the server 
operating the requested Web site. As the server receives the 
access-request, it, in turn, sends a location request (e.g. 
forwards the access-seeker’s Internet Protocol (“IP”)) address) 
to the provider of the geo-location service. The provider of the 
geo-location service has gathered information about the IP 
addresses in use, and built up a database of geo-location on the 
information in this database, the provider of the geo-location 
service gives the Web site server an educated guess as to the 
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It can be argued however, that the imposition of technological borders on the 
internet would undermine its universal reach and ultimately, create more problems 
than it can solve. The central problem with the imposition of technological 
boundaries on the internet is that it would radically reduce online business and 
global exchanges, and hence, it will likely to be opposed by both the public and the 
industry. It would undermine the most compelling characteristics of internet 
transactions, global reach, ubiquity and ease of access.142 
V. TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON INTERNET 
JURISDICTION 
After analyzing various solutions that have been presented for the 
identification of the proper basis of determining jurisdiction in internet disputes, it 
is suggested that the formulation and reliance of international conventions is the 
most effective strategy.143 There is considerable support for the view that 
international agreement on jurisdiction in internet disputes is the best means of 
enhancing clarity and consistency in this area.144 
A. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
The present international agreements governing international trade and 
commerce do not expressly address the issue of determining jurisdiction in internet 
disputes. The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (“HCCA”), 
signed in June 2005 by Member States of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, applies in international cases to exclusive choice of court 
agreements on civil and commercial matters.145 Article 5 states that “[t]he court or 
courts of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement 
                                                                                                                                      
access-seeker’s location. Armed with this information, the Web 
server can provide the access-seeker with the information 
deemed suitable, or if desirable, deny access to the requested 
content. 
142 Svantesson, supra note 96, at 357–58.  
143 See Rene David, The Methods of Unification, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 13, 24 (1968). See also 
Johnston & Powles, supra note 2, at 14–20 (2004). See also Wautelet, supra note 2. 
144 Benedicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Comparative Law or Conflict of Laws: Allies or Enemies? New 
Perspectives on an Old Couple, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 407, 415 (2001). See generally Andrew Strauss, 
Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law of Personal Jurisdiction in 
Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT’L L. REV. 373, 373 (1995). 
145 Hague Convention on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 
June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294. 
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shall have jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the agreement applies, unless 
the agreement is null and void under the law of that State.”146 
While the HCCA is a valuable development, it is still limited by a variety of 
critical factors. The most obvious limitation is that it only applies where there is a 
formal exclusive choice agreement.147 Article 1(2) defines an exclusive choice of 
court agreement to be one which designates the courts of a Member State or States 
to the Hague Convention to hold the exclusive jurisdiction for adjudicating 
disputes.148 Furthermore, the agreement must either be written or be available in a 
form which is accessible for subsequent reference.149 Additionally, the HCAA only 
applies to civil and commercial matters, leaving whole realms of internet disputes 
such as content regulation and internet crime outside its ambit.150 Finally, because 
it does not apply to tortuous disputes, it will not assist in determining jurisdiction in 
internet defamation disputes.151  
It is interesting to note that the initial draft of the HCCA was much wider in 
scope. The present 2005 Agreement is the result of a lengthy discourse that 
commenced in 1993 as the “Hague Project on International Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement in Civil and Commercial Matters.”152 At the Seventeenth Session of 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law in May 1993, “[t]he Working 
Group proposed a [C]onvention of a mixed type, as suggested by the American 
scholar von Mehren.”153 The proposed Convention would be mixed because it 
would include “uniform rules for direct jurisdiction and rules for recognition and 
enforcement of judgments.”154 No consensus was reached on the 1993 draft 
proposal so it was determined that a “bottom-up” approach would be preferable to 
the previously employed “top-down” approach.155  
                                                          
146 Id. at art. 5. 
147 Id. at art. 1(1). 
148 Id. at art. 1(2). 
149 Id. at art. 3. 
150 Id. at art. 1(1). 
151 Id. at art. 2. 
152 VAN LITH, supra note 5, at 14. 
153 Id. at 15 (discussing the contribution made by Arthur von Mehren’s Recognition Convention 
Study in Final Report to the U.S. Department of State (1992)). 
154 Id. at 15. 
155 Id. at 15–16.  
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Subsequently in April 2002, the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law identified a list of “hard-core issues” to be addressed including choice of court 
clauses, defendant’s domicile, submissions, branches, trusts, physical torts and 
counter-claims.156 No agreement was reached on the 2002 agenda either, so the 
project was narrowed to address only choice of court agreements.157 This resulted 
in the successful June 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.158 
The time taken to deliberate and achieve consensus on the narrow jurisdictional 
issue of choice of court agreements does not augur well for the design and 
implementation of a more comprehensive international convention on the 
determination of internet jurisdiction.159 
While the 1993 Hague draft proposal did not succeed, the 2000 report entitled 
“Achieving Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global 
Jurisdiction Issues Created by the Internet” provides useful guidelines on the 
issue.160 The project proposes six jurisdictional default rules that should form the 
basis of any solution to a jurisdictional dispute arising from an e-commerce 
transaction.161 The first rule stipulates that every party on the internet is subject to a 
personal and prescriptive jurisdiction.162 The second rule states that where a web 
site is passive and does not target any particular State, personal or prescriptive 
jurisdiction should not be assigned.163 Under the third rule, a court may assert 
jurisdiction over a sponsor in a State (such as a website content provider) in the 
absence of an enforceable contractual choice of law and forum provision if the 
following two conditions are met: (1) The sponsor is a habitual resident or has its 
principal place of business in the State; and (2) There is evidence to suggest that: 
                                                          
156 Id. at 16. 
157 Id. 
158 VAN LITH, supra note 5, at 16. 
159 See generally FAUSTO POCAR, THE HAGUE PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION ON 
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROUND TABLE 77 (2005); P.E. Nygh, Declining 
Jurisdiction Under the Brussels I Regulation 2001 and the Preliminary Draft Hague Judgments 
Convention: A Comparison, in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW—
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR PETER NORTH 303, 308 (James Fawcett ed., 2002). See also Kurt H. 
Nadelmann, The International Unification of Law: Uniform Legislation Versus International 
Conventions Revisited, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 28–50 (1968). 
160 See generally Richard Paul Salis, Achieving Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace, 7 LEX 
ELECTRONICA (2001), available at http://www.lex-electronica.org/articles/v7-1/Salis.htm (summarizing 
American Bar Association, Achieving Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global 
Jurisdiction Issues Created by the Internet, 55 BUS. LAW. 1801 (2000)). 
161 Id. at (1)(A)(5)–(9). 
162 Id. at (1)(A)(5). 
163 Id. 
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(a) the sponsor has targeted the State and the claim arises out of a transaction 
involving website consent; or (b) the website is interactive and the sponsor could 
be fairly considered to have knowingly engaged in business transactions in the 
State.164 Interestingly, under the fourth rule, a sponsor’s installation of disclosures, 
disclaimers, software and other technical blocking strategies seeking to prevent 
users from accessing the site or service are considered measures of good faith, 
which are capable of protecting the sponsor from being subjected to an end user’s 
jurisdiction.165  
The proposed rules have a variety of merits. First, as the applications of the 
proposed rules are not predicated on a choice of court arrangement, they can be 
applied more broadly than the Hague Convention. Moreover, the proposed rules are 
also wider in application than the targeting and effects principle for determining 
internet jurisdiction. This is because the Report goes on to propose that jurisdiction 
should not be enforced merely because it is permissible under the rules of 
international law. The sixth default jurisdiction rule proposes other factors that 
should be considered in determining internet jurisdiction.166 Such factors include 
the “risk of legal conflicts as a result of the application of state laws, the potential 
hindrance of e-commerce trading, the gravity of the regulatory or tax benefits to be 
gained, and the interests of justice or convenience of the parties.”167 
The negative aspect of the rules is that they do not provide any greater 
certainty and predictability on the issue of determining jurisdiction in internet 
disputes than the purposeful availment test. The uncertainty that exists in case law 
as to what constitutes targeting seems to apply equally to the application of default 
jurisdiction rules. However, in a context in which the Zippo test still continues to be 
used in the courts, the rules form a clear selection of the targeting approach when 
applying the purposeful availment basis for asserting jurisdiction in internet 
disputes. Resultantly, it provides greater certainty to the issue of jurisdiction than 
what presently exists the law. 
B. Towards Unification of Jurisdiction Rules 
A compelling case can be made for further unification of jurisdiction at an 
international level. The primary benefit for unification of international 
jurisdictional rules is that the “international community would benefit from 
                                                          
164 Id. at (1)(A)(6). 
165 Id. 
166 Salis, supra note 160, at (1)(A)(9). 
167 Id. 
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jurisdictional certainty and predictability in cross-border activities and transnational 
commercial contracts.”168 Van Lith further suggests that:  
[j]urisdictional certainty through unification of 
international jurisdiction can be achieved by finding 
uniform jurisdiction rules suitable for international 
(contractual) disputes. This entails eliminating 
exorbitant jurisdiction rules, avoiding multiple forums 
and finding acceptable and feasible connecting factors 
for a uniform jurisdictional system.169 
It is argued that the present uncertainty generates a variety of negative and positive 
conflicts. Positive jurisdictional conflicts occur when the presence of multiple 
competent forums results in forum shopping.170 In comparison, negative 
jurisdictional conflicts arise when disparate national jurisdiction rules lead to an 
absence of a forum, creating a jurisdictional vacuum which leaves the parties with 
no avenue of resort.  
Historically, a significant obstacle to the development of an international 
agreement in this area is that internet disputes simultaneously involve a variety of 
disparate issues that are traditionally dealt with under differing topics of law.171 For 
example, a single internet content dispute can hypothetically involve issues of 
commerce, free speech, violations of privacy, and tortious and criminal liability. 
Traditionally, all such legal issues have been adjudicated separately but internet 
content disputes weave all of these issues together, resulting in a difficult barrier to 
international harmonization.  
A second significant obstacle to the acceptance of rules of international 
jurisdiction is that such rules are commonly viewed as constituting an unreasonable 
interference with state sovereignty.172 By unifying the rules for international 
jurisdiction, a State’s independence and autonomy is undermined as it is forced to 
                                                          
168 See VAN LITH, supra note 5, at 19. 
169 Id. at 20. 
170 See generally Ferrari, supra note 7 (explaining the effects of the choice of forum clause and 
absence of the choice of forum clause in foreign jurisdictions, namely the difference between default 
choice of forum clauses present in various European conventions). 
171 See Timofeeva, supra note 80, at 199. 
172 Id. at 217. 
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either accept or reject jurisdiction in a particular case.173 In many cases, an 
international agreement would compel a State to accept or refuse jurisdiction 
pursuant to the agreement.174 Moreover, the failure of the 1993 proposal of the 
Hague Choice of Court Agreements suggests that it is unlikely that a unification 
consensus can be achieved. Commentators have also criticized the move to 
unification, Fauvarque-Cosson noted that the unification movement appears to be 
“in crisis.”175 Similarly, van Lith notes that the Proceedings of the Round Table 
record the comments of Pierre Mayer that the “metaphysical interest or this 
romantic idea behind unification” of the “spectacle of uniformity” in a globalized 
world, is misplaced.176 It is suggested that “trying to achieve uniformity brings with 
it serious drawbacks.”177 It has been further suggested that the world is not ready 
for an international solution. Timofeeva suggested that a “realistic goal” would be 
to harmonize existing and developing jurisdiction rules in internet disputes at a 
national level.178 Such an approach would entail generalizing such harmonized 
rules into “customs of international law” and establishing “common principles not 
from below rather than ‘above.’”179 
Despite these acknowledged challenges, what emerges from the various 
proposed solutions is that it is in the interests of both individual States and the 
international community as a whole to seek unification at an international level 
through the formulation of international conventions and principles.180 While the 
experience with the formulation of the HCCA is not encouraging, it is suggested 
that the world today is more cognisant of the need to achieve harmonization of 
jurisdiction rules in order to support internet commerce than it was in 2005. 
Further, it is submitted that in harmonizing and formulating international 
jurisdiction rules, it is critical to integrate the objective of technology-neutrality. 
This objective will enable the rules of determining jurisdiction to be based on the 
substantive characteristics of the internet relationship and transaction instead of the 
technical characteristics of the website, which being typically fluid and evolving, 
do not provide a solid basis for the design of jurisdiction rules. 
                                                          
173 VAN LITH, supra note 5, at 21. 
174 Salis, supra note 160, at 32. 
175 Fauvarque-Cosson, supra note 144, at 415. 
176 VAN LITH, supra note 5 n.99. 
177 Id. See also Matthew Fagin, Regulating Speech Across Borders: Technology vs. Values, 9 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 395–455 (2003). 
178 Timofeeva, supra note 80, at 224. 
179 Id. at 224. 
180 See generally Fagin, supra note 177. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The reach, popularity and immediacy of the internet make it a very different 
vessel of communication and publication that must be addressed by private 
international law. While it has always been challenging to apply jurisdictional 
principles to trans-border disputes,181 it is clear that the internet has heightened this 
challenge to a qualitatively new level.182 In such a landscape of technological 
evolution, it is necessary to design new fine-grain and technologically-neutral 
principles for determining internet jurisdiction.183 The proposed solutions range 
from strengthening existing jurisdiction rules, to modifying, extending and 
developing present jurisdiction rules to the creation of a whole new language of 
jurisdictional basis for the determination of internet disputes.184  
It can be seen that the judicial and academic consideration of the vexed issue 
of internet jurisdiction has sought to engage with the realities of the internet 
landscape and sought to address a variety of issues such as the nature and extent of 
the influence asserted, the level of interactivity and the nature and foreseeability of 
the damage caused. However, despite such endeavours, there remains a high level 
of divergence in the proposed reforms and refinements. The central issue to be 
addressed is whether internet jurisdiction should be developed to support pervasive, 
far-reaching, extraterritorial regulation or whether it should be developed to 
consciously limit the exercise of such jurisdiction.185  
Once the importance of achieving international unification of jurisdiction 
rules is accepted, the international law is both sufficiently flexible and realistic to 
address the challenge of unification. As Fagin notes, the belief that international 
law can meet this challenge of achieving unification can perhaps be derived from 
the similarities between the international legal framework and the Internet itself:  
Like the Internet, international law is spun from the 
convergence of shared norms and rules—technical 
standards that help it operate.186 Like international law, 
the Internet is itself driven by the benefits of and beset 
                                                          
181 Timofeeva, supra note 80, at 201. 
182 Id. 
183 Fagin, supra note 177, at 406. 
184 Timofeeva, supra note 80, at 201. 
185 Id. at 200. 
186 Fagin, supra note 177, at 455. 
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by the challenges of a global coexistence.187 While a 
new medium, the internet encourages the application of 
old strategies and demands of us the implementation of 
the underlying commitments and aspirations of the 
international legal framework—if we desire to maintain 
the benefits of interdependence we must work as one to 
forge workable solutions in support of our common 
goals.188  
Cassese famously noted that international law is a “realistic” legal system.189 “It 
takes into account existing power relationships and endeavours to translate them 
into legal rules.”190 Therefore, the unique and flexible features of the internet which 
form a challenge to the application of traditional principles of private international 
laws also contain the very seeds of the solution. 
                                                          
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (2d ed. 2005). 
190 Id. at 12–13. 
